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Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!
James E. Fleming*
Abstract
In recent years, some have asked: "Are we all originalists now?" My
response is: "I hope not!" In this Article, I explain why. But first, I show that
there is a trick in the question: Even to pose the question "Are we all originalists
now?" suggests that one is presupposing what I shall call "the originalist
premise. " To answer the question affirmatively certainly shows that one is
presupposing it. The originalist premise is the assumption that originalism,
rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the assumption that
originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best, or indeed the only, conception of
constitutional interpretation. Why so? Because originalism, rightly conceived,
just has to be. By definition. In the nature of things-in the nature of the
Constitution, in the nature of law, in the nature of interpretation, in the nature of
fidelity in constitutional interpretation! I will sketch some of the problematic
assumptions underlying this premise (and thus underlying the projects of many
scholars who seek to reconstruct originalism or to put forward new originalisms).
Worse yet, raising the question "Are we all originalists now?" may presuppose
that we all have come around to Justice Antonin Scalia's and Robert Bork's ways
of thinking, without conceding that many versions of originalism themselves have
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been moving targets that have moved considerably toward the positions of their
critics.
IfI hope we are not all originalists now, what do I hope we (at least some of
us) are? Much of the best work in constitutional theory today is not originalist in
either an old or a new sense; rather, it is what I have called "constructivist." I am
interested in developing a constructivist account of the uses of history in
constitutional interpretation. A constructivist world would look somewhat like the
pre-originalist world (that is, the pre-Borkian world), although it would be far
more sophisticated theoretically than that world was. It would treat original
meaning as one source ofconstitutional meaning among several, not the exclusive
source, let alone the exclusive legitimate theory. It would use history for what it
teaches rather than for what it purportedly decides for us. In a constructivist
world, we would understand that history is a jumble of open possibilities, not
authoritative, determinate answers. We would understand that we-self-styled
originalists no less than the rest of us-always read the past selectively, from the
standpoint of the present, in anticipation of the future. We look to the past, not for
authoritative answers, but for illumination about our experience and our
commitments. Finally, we would understand that it dishonors the past to
pretend-in the name of originalism-that it authoritatively decides questions for
us, and to pretend that it avoids the burden of making normative arguments about
the meaning of our commitments to abstract moral principles and ends. I argue
that fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written requires a philosophic
approach to constitutional interpretation. No approach-including no version of
originalism-can responsibly avoid philosophic reflection and choice in
interpreting the Constitution.
I. Are We All Originalists Now?
In recent years, some have asked: "Are we all originalists now?" My
response is: "I hope not!" By contrast, Lawrence Solum replies: "We Are All
Originalists Now."' The answer to the question depends, as he recognizes, on
"what one means by originalism"2 and whether we define it exclusively or
inclusively.
In defining originalism, Solum distills an elegant framework with four
basic ideas. It is worth quoting in full:
* The fixation thesis: The linguistic meaning of the constitutional text
was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified.
* The public meaning thesis: Constitutional meaning is fixed by the
understanding of the words and phrases and the grammar and syntax
1. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE
1 (2011). Since I cite only to Solum's contribution to the debate in this book, I shall refer to it
hereinafter as SOLUM. In this section and the next, I draw from my review of the book, James E.
Fleming, The New Originalist Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539 (2013).
2. SOLUM, supra note 1, at 61.
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that characterized the linguistic practices of the public and not by the
intentions of the framers.
* The textual constraint thesis: The original meaning of the text of the
Constitution has legal force: the text is law and not a mere symbol.
* The interpretation-construction distinction: Constitutional practice
includes two distinct activities: (1) constitutional interpretation,
which discerns the linguistic meaning of the text, and
(2) constitutional construction, which determines the legal effect of
the text.
Solum aspires to understand originalism and, for that matter, living
constitutionalism "in their best light-in their most sophisticated and
defensible versions."
If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say that we
evidently are all originalists now. Indeed, we might just define originalism so
broadly that even I would no longer hope that we are not all originalists now!
Applying Solum's framework, we would conclude that Jack Balkin, with his
self-described living originalist method of text and principle, definitely is an
originalist. Ronald Dworkin, with his moral reading of the Constitution, 6
surely also is. Sotirios A. Barber and I, with our philosophic approach to
constitutional interpretation 7 (and my own "Constitution-perfecting theory"),8
are as well. (By "moral reading" and "philosophic approach," I refer to
conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political
principles-not merely codifying concrete historical rules or practices-and
of interpretation of those principles as requiring judgments of political theory
about how they are best understood-not merely historical research to
discover relatively specific original meanings.) So, too, are reasonable,
bounded, and grounded versions of living constitutionalism. All of these
theories evidently can accept the four theses quoted above. Under Solum's
formulation, originalism clearly is a big tent-charitable, magnanimous, and
inclusionary-rather than the dogmatic, scolding, and exclusionary outlook
that we see in originalist works like Robert Bork's The Tempting of America
and Antonin Scalia's A Matter ofInterpretation.9
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 5.
5. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-6 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINAL-
ISM].
6. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 2 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW].
7. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC
QUESTIONS xiii, 155 (2007).
8. JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY
16, 210-11 (2006).
9. Compare SOLUM, supra note 1, at 1-77 (arguing that "we are all originalists now" by broadly
defining originalism), with ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 136, 143 (Touchstone 1991) (1990) (arguing that "only the approach of
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But if we define originalism so inclusively-and we are all now in this
big tent-it may not be very useful to say that we are all originalists now. We
may obscure our differences more than elucidate common ground. For we
would persist in most of our theoretical disagreements-it is just that we
would say that the disagreements are among varieties of so-called originalism.
And the debates concerning interpretation and construction, thus recast or
translated, would go on much as before.
Clearly, affirmative answers to the question "Are we all originalists
now?" stem from inclusive conceptions of what comes within originalism and,
in particular, the new originalism or new originalisms. For we most definitely
are not all old originalists now!
II. The Inclusiveness of New Originalisms
What is the new originalism? Who are the new originalists? And what is
new about their originalism? 10 These questions presuppose three prior
questions: What is the old originalism? Who are the old originalists? And why
have many constitutional scholars and jurists sought to move beyond old
originalism to new originalism?
What? The old originalism is an ism-a conservative ideology that
emerged in reaction to the Warren Court (and early Burger Court). Before
Richard Nixon and Robert Bork launched their attacks on the Court,
originalism as we now know it did not exist. Constitutional interpretation in
light of original understanding" did exist, but original understanding was seen
as merely one source of constitutional decision making among several-not as
a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive
legitimate theory. The old originalists conceive original understanding in
terms of concrete intentions of the Framers or their original expected
applications (as distinguished from their abstract intentions).' 2 Accordingly,
these originalists argue that fidelity in constitutional interpretation requires
following the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively specific
original understanding of, the Framers of the Constitution. And, they argue
original understanding" as he conceives it "is consonant with the design of the American Republic"
and describing "new theorists of constitutional law" as espousing views that involve "nothing less
than the subversion of the law's foundations"), and ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37-48 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that
only originalists look for "the original meaning of the text" and scathingly criticizing theories of "The
Living Constitution" as rejecting the original meaning as an authoritative guide).
10. 1 have addressed these questions in BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 7, at 91-98, and in
Fleming, supra note 1, at 544-46. 1 have incorporated some of those analyses in this Part.
11. Here I am using the term "original understanding" generically to include original understand-
ing, intention of the framers, and original public meaning. I am not taking a position on the debates
between varieties of originalism concerning these particular formulations.
12. SOLIJM, supra note 1, at 7-11; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 599, 603 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, The New Originalism].
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that these concrete intentions or original expected applications are
determinative concerning constitutional doctrine.' 3
Who? The old originalists include, most prominently, Bork and Raoul
Berger.14
Why? The old originalism is vulnerable to dispositive criticisms. In his
book, Constitutional Interpretation, Keith Whittington has forthrightly
addressed many of these criticisms, for example, that the old originalism is
circular, question begging, and axiomatic.' 5 Likewise, in the book Constitu-
tional Originalism: A Debate, Solum has acknowledged the shortcomings of
the old originalism.16 I would argue that the old originalism suffers from three
incorrigible flaws: (1) the moral burden of the old originalism with regard to
both rights and powers: its concrete intentionalism entails that Brown v. Board
of Education7 was wrongly decided' 8 and that most of the modern federal
government is unconstitutional;19 (2) the authoritarianism of the old original-
ism is a massive insult to the dignity of both the founders and us-it attributes
arrogance to the authors of the norms of the Constitution and subservience to
the subjects of those norms (to add further insult, its proponents serve it up to
us in the name of democracy!); and (3) its concrete intentionalism is untenable
as a theory of interpretation of our Constitution, which establishes a charter of
abstract aspirational principles and ends and an outline of general powers, not
a code of detailed rules.
I shall sketch several available varieties of new originalism. My sketch
will be broader and less programmatic than the accounts of "the new
originalism" advanced by Whittington and Solum. 20 Many self-styled
originalists are at pains to differentiate themselves from old originalists like
Berger and to insist that their versions of originalism are not vulnerable to
common criticisms of the old originalism. There is an argument that even
13. SOLUM, supra note 1, at 21.
14. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 28 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that his purpose was "to ascertain what the
framers sought to accomplish").
15. KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGI-
NAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 46 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION].
16. SOLUM, supra note 1, at 20-21.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 14, at 133-54 (criticizing Brown as wrongly decided).
19. Even some new originalists take such a narrow view of the scope of the federal government's
powers that they imply that much if not most of the modem federal government is unconstitutional.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
273-318 (2004).
20. Like Mitch Berman and Kevin Toh, I am here distinguishing "new originalisms" from "the
new originalism." Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from
Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2) (on file
with author). The new originalism is more programmatic and is associated with Whittington, Solum,
and Randy Barnett. Id (manuscript at 9). New originalisms could include broad or abstract
originalisms that are not associated with the programs of those scholars.
2013] 1789
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Scalia is a new originalist. In Originalism: The Lesser Evil, Scalia rejects
"strong medicine originalism," which he associates with Berger: roughly,
originalism that is prepared to swallow the bitter pill of following whatever
historical research shows to be the concrete framers' intention, even if, e.g., it
entails that Brown was wrongly decided. 21 Instead, he embraces
"fainted-hearted originalism" (surprising as that label may sound coming from
his mouth!): originalism with a dose of evolutionary intent to the Constitution,
or a "trace of constitutional perfectionism," e.g., Brown was rightly decided. 22
Furthermore, Scalia has supplemented originalism with his understanding that
the Constitution includes certain traditions, understood as specific historical
practices as distinguished from abstract aspirational principles.2 3 Thus, Bork
charges that Scalia is a conservative constitutional revisionist, i.e., a new
originalist. 24 Scalia also has "adulterate[d]" originalism 25 by making a
"pragmatic exception" to accommodate some precedents that are inconsistent
with his view of the original public meaning. 26 Officially, Scalia accepts
original public meaning as opposed to intention of the framers as the
authoritative source. 27 In this respect, he comes within what Solum charac-
terizes as the new originalism. 28 But Scalia rejects Solum's
interpretation-construction distinction-viewing what Solum conceives as
construction as beyond the pale of originalist interpretation.2 9 In this respect,
he differs importantly from Solum's conception of the new originalism. 30
Whittington certainly qualifies as a new originalist. Before reading
Whittington's article on The New Originalism,3 1 I had thought that the new,
improved originalists would be scholars and jurists who seek to reconstruct
originalism to correct the theoretical flaws of the old originalism or at least to
bolster it against powerful criticisms. But Whittington, with startling and
refreshing frankness, provides a rather different account: He says that the new
originalists are conservatives in power, whereas the old originalists were
21. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989).
22. See id at 863-64.
23. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (acknowledg-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment protects unenumerated liberties that are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition"). For a criticism of Scalia's understanding of tradition as "concrete
historical practices," as distinguished from Brennan's understanding of tradition as "abstract
aspirational principles," see FLEMING, supra note 8, at 112-16.
24. See BORK, supra note 9, at 223, 236-37 (criticizing Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H.
as a version of "conservative constitutional revisionism" as distinguished from originalism).
25. Scalia, supra note 21.
26. SCALIA, supra note 9, at 140.
27. Id at 38.
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
29. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 13-15, 427 (2012).
30. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
31. Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 12.
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conservatives in the minority!3 2 His account of the old originalism is quite
similar to mine: It emerged as a conservative reaction against the Warren
Court and was mostly negative and critical of Warren Court decisions like
Griswold v. Connecticut,33 recognizing a right of privacy, and early Burger
Court decisions like Roe v. Wade,34 recognizing the right of a woman to
terminate a pregnancy. Now that conservatives are in power and have
control of the judiciary, Whittington says, originalists need to move from
being largely reactive and critical to developing "a governing philosophy
appropriate to guide majority opinions, not just to fill dissents." 3 6 Enter the
new originalism.
As a governing conservative constitutional theory, Whittington suggests,
the new originalism "is less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to
judicial restraint,"37 the leading aim of the old originalism. 3 8 Indeed. First,
"there seems to be less emphasis on the capacity of originalism to limit the
discretion of the judge."39 Second, "there is also a loosening of the connection
between originalism and judicial deference to legislative majorities." 40
Instead, "[t]he primary virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of
constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic
majoritarianism." 41 In sum, Whittington argues, the new originalism "does
not require judges to get out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges to
uphold the original Constitution-nothing more, but also nothing less."4 2
Now, I have always known this-that originalism is not fundamentally a
theory of "judicial restraint" or democratic majoritarianism-but rather a
program for upholding the Constitution as originalists conceive it. Still, it's
good to hear it proclaimed by a thoughtful originalist!
Solum's account of the old originalism is similar to Whittington's. 4 3 And
their accounts of the new originalism are similar in two respects. Solum's new
originalism, like Whittington's, stresses: (1) original public meaning (as
contrasted with the old originalists' emphasis on the intention of the Framers
or their original expected applications) and (2) the significance of the
32. Id. at 604.
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 410 U.S. i13 (1973).
35. Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 12, at 601-03.
36. Id. at 604.
37. Id. at 608.
38. Id. at 602.
39. Id. at 608.
40. Id at 609.
41. Id
42. Id
43. See SOLUM, supra note 1, at 5-11 (tracing the history of originalism and explaining the views
of "old" originalists).
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distinction between interpretation and construction (as contrasted with the old
originalists' rejection of construction as illegitimate).44
But Solum's new originalism is significantly different. Whittington
developed his new originalism to replace the old originalists' negative reaction
against the liberal Warren Court with a governing constitutional theory for
conservative judges, now that they are in power. 4 5  Solum, by contrast,
developed his new originalism to overcome the theoretical errors and excesses
not only of the old originalists but also of Legal Realism and Critical Legal
Studies.46 In fact, he wants to acknowledge the conservative ideology of the
old originalists but to distance that from the new originalism, which he views
not as an ideology but as a constitutional theory.4 7
New originalists surely also include the "broad originalists," for example,
Lawrence Lessig, Akhil Amar, and Bruce Ackerman.4 8 These scholars do not
necessarily identify with or come within what Whittington and Solum call "the
new originalism," but they nonetheless profess to develop or are identified
with broad, new originalisms. They are liberals who want to reclaim history
from the narrow originalists. They believe that liberals and progressives
ignored or neglected history for so long that they practically ceded it to
conservatives. 49 The broad originalists undertake the "turn to history" to show
that their constitutional theories, aspirations, and ideals are firmly rooted in
our constitutional history and practice, and indeed provide a better account of
our constitutional text and tradition than do those of the conservative narrow
originalists. 50 In general, what is broad about their forms of originalism is that
44. Id. at 22-24, 34-36.
45. See supra notes 32, 36-42 and accompanying text.
46. SOLUM, supra note 1, at 50-54.
47. Id at 64.
48. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 88, 159-62 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (developing an understanding of interpretation as questing
"multigenerational synthesis" or "interpretive synthesis" across the three constitutional regimes or
moments of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION xi (2005) (contending that readers cannot fully appreciate the Constitution's
"meaning and richness" without historical background as context); see generally Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]
(developing a conception of fidelity as translation). Ackerman, Amar, and Lessig are sometimes
interpreted as developing broad originalism-or "a kinder, gentler originalism"-for liberals. See
Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case ofOriginal
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1774-87 (1997) (criticizing the "[k]inder, [g]entler [o]riginalism[s]" of
Ackerman and Lessig); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 212-29
(1996) (analyzing Ackerman and Amar as liberals who have taken the turn to history and relating their
work to "liberal originalism"). Amar primarily does constitutional interpretation without writing
about approaches to constitutional interpretation, but on occasion he has called for "rethinking
originalism." Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism, SLATE (Sept. 21, 2005),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandjpolitics/jurisprudence/2005/09/rethinkingoriginal-
ism.html.
49. See KALMAN, supra note 48, at 132-35, 138-39, 141, 156 (discussing liberal "[alcademic
lawyers ... ced[ing] the historical battleground to the right" and now trying to reclaim it).
50. See, e.g., id. at 212-29 (evaluating Ackerman's and Amar's uses of history).
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these theorists and historians conceive original understanding or original
meaning (to which they argue fidelity is owed) at a considerably higher level
of abstraction than do the narrow originalists like Bork and Scalia (to say
nothing of Whittington).5 ' At the same time, they typically argue that the
quest for fidelity in constitutional interpretation requires that we reject abstract
theories like Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution.5 2
In 1996, Fordham had a major conference on Fidelity in Constitutional
Theory. In my article for the conference, Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution, I explored the reasons for broad originalists' resistance to the
moral reading.54 I argued that "broad originalists, like . . . narrow originalists,
fundamentally misconceive fidelity."55 The commitment to fidelity entails, as
Dworkin argues, that we should interpret the Constitution so as to make it the
best it can be.56 I also suggested that the "moral reading is a big tent," and that
the broad originalists should "reconceive their work as coming within it: in
particular, as being in service of the moral reading by providing a firmer
grounding for [it] in fit with historical materials than Dworkin has offered."57
On another occasion, I plan to say more by way of constructive engagement
with the broad originalists.
Balkin's abstract "living originalism" certainly counts as a variety of new
originalism. Like Solum, he stresses original public meaning and the
significance of the distinction between interpretation and construction." Like
the broad originalists, he argues that the original public meaning of the
Constitution to which fidelity is owed is not only rules but also general
standards and abstract principles.59 And he, like Dworkin and I, rejects efforts
by originalists to recast abstract principles as if they were rules (or terms of art)
by interpreting them as being exhausted by their original expected
applications.60 In short, he argues that fidelity to original public meaning
entails fidelity to our abstract framework and commitments.6 Elsewhere, I
have argued that Balkin's abstract living originalism not only comes within the
51. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 321 (1992)
(arguing for the liberating "power of abstraction" in interpreting the Bill of Rights).
52. See, e.g., Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 48, at 1259-60 (arguing that the quest for
fidelity requires rejection of Dworkin's theory).
53. Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1247 (1997).
54. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335,
1344-53 (1997) [hereinafter Fleming, Fidelity].
55. Id. at 1338.
56. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 255 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE].
57. Fleming, Fidelity, supra note 54, at 1338.
58. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 4-5, 48-50.
59. Id. at 23-34.
60. Id. at 42-45.
61. Id. at 21-34.
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big tent of the moral reading but also has close affinities to Dworkin's moral
reading and Barber's and my philosophic approach.62
Finally, Whittington even interpreted Dworkin (of all people!) as a new
originalist. 63 After all, Dworkin professes fidelity to original meaning,
conceived as abstract moral principles rather than particular historical
conceptions.64 Similarly, Amy Gutmann portrayed Dworkin as an abstract
originalist in her introduction to A Matter of Interpretation, the book
publishing Scalia's Tanner Lectures at Princeton together with the
commentaries upon them, including Dworkin's. 6 5 As I have put it, Dworkin
has sought to turn the tables on the narrow originalists like Bork and Scalia: he
argues that commitment to fidelity (understood as pursuing integrity with the
moral reading of the Constitution) entails the very approach that they are at
pains to insist it forbids and prohibits the very approach that they imperiously
maintain it mandates.66 But I would resist characterizing Dworkin as a new
originalist, for doing so seems to presuppose that anyone who argues that she
or he has the best constitutional theory-of what the Constitution is, what is
interpretation, and what is fidelity in constitutional interpretation-is claiming
thereby to be an originalist. (See my discussion below of "the originalist
premise.")
If all of the above are new originalists, new originalism is truly inclusive.
It is a "[f]amily of [t]heories," 67 not one unified view.
III. The Originalist Premise
As I mentioned earlier, some have posed the question: "Are we all
originalists now?"'68 If anything would prompt that question, it would be
Dworkin and Balkin articulating their theories as forms of originalism (or, at
any rate, being interpreted as originalists). 69 For they are exemplars of two
b&tes noires of originalism as conventionally understood: namely, the moral
reading of the Constitution and pragmatic, living constitutionalism,
62. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 675-79
[hereinafter Fleming, Balkinization].
63. See Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin 's "Originalism ": The Role ofIntentions in Constitutional
Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 201 (2000) [hereinafter Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism"]
(arguing that Dworkin is an originalist who believes "the Founders chose abstract principles").
64. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 6, at 7-12, 72-76; Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous
Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1249, 1253 (1997)
[hereinafter Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue].
65. Amy Gutmann, Preface to SCALIA, supra note 9, at xi-xii.
66. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 6, at 73-76; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION:
AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 125-29 (1993)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION].
67. SOLUM, supra note 1, at 35.
68. See supra Part 1.
69. See Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism," supra note 63 (arguing that Dworkin is an
abstract originalist). See generally BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 5 (contending that the
method of text and principle constitutes a living originalism).
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respectively. I suppose that such developments have led to Solum's claim that
we are all originalists now.
With all due respect to Solum, given how much these versions of
"originalism" differ, it would not mean much to claim that this shows that we
are all originalists now. Indeed, we are witnessing the "Balkanization" of
originalism (that's what happens when originalism splits into warring camps)
along with the "Balkinization" of originalism (that's what happens when even
Jack Balkin, hitherto a progressive, pragmatic living constitutionalist,
becomes an originalist).70
Furthermore, there is a trick in the question "Are we all originalists
now?" Even to pose the question suggests that one is presupposing what I
shall call "the originalist premise." To answer the question affirmatively
certainly shows that one is presupposing it. The originalist premise is the
assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only,
conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is
the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best-or
indeed the only-conception of constitutional interpretation. Why so?
Because originalism, rightly conceived, just has to be. By definition. In the
nature of things-in the nature of the Constitution, in the nature of law, in the
nature of interpretation, in the nature of fidelity in constitutional
interpretation!
The originalist premise is expressed in its most extreme form by Bork,
who asserted that originalism is the only possible approach to constitutional
interpretation that is faithful to the historic Constitution and consonant with
the constitutional design. 7 1 He rejects all other approaches, most especially
those like Dworkin's, as revisionist. 72 In recent years, the originalist premise
has also been manifested in the emerging strain of broad originalism in liberal
and progressive constitutional theory. For example, Lessig evidently takes the
view that originalism, by definition, is the only method of fidelity. 73 Most
strikingly, he made the Borkish assertion that Dworkin is an "infidel,"7 4 and he
and Cass Sunstein suggested that Dworkin does not even have a method of
fidelity.75 I believe that the originalist premise drives the broad originalists'
resistance to Dworkin's moral reading. We also see the originalist premise
illustrated more innocuously in the inclusiveness of the new originalism as
programmatically developed by Solum. The moment an ostensible
70. James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10 (2007); Fleming,
Balkinization, supra note 62. In this Part, I draw from the former piece.
71. See BORK, supra note 9, at 143.
72. See id at 187-240.
73. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 85 n.336 (1994) ("There are of course methods of constitutional interpretation that are not
methods of fidelity, in the sense that they do not ultimately depend on whether the outcome is
traceable to some judgment or commitment of the framers.").
74. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 48, at 1260.
75. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 73, at 11 n.35, 85 n.336.
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anti-originalist like Dworkin or I acknowledges that original public meaning is
a factor in constitutional interpretation and professes an aspiration to fidelity in
constitutional interpretation, she or he is welcomed into the big tent of the new
originalism. 76
What troubles me most is that raising the question "Are we all originalists
now?" may presuppose that we all have come around to Scalia's and Bork's
ways of thinking without conceding that many versions of originalism
themselves are moving targets that have moved considerably toward the
positions of their critics. To illustrate, let's have a pop quiz. Read the
following passage:
In short, all that a judge committed to original understanding requires is
that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not
with a conclusion but with a major premise. That major premise is a
principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect against
hostile legislation or executive action. The judge must then see whether
that principle or value is threatened by the statute or action challenged
in the case before him. The answer to that question provides his minor
premise, and the conclusion follows. It does not follow without
difficulty, and two judges equally devoted to the original purpose may
disagree about the reach or application of the principle at stake and so
arrive at different results, but that in no way distinguishes the task from
the difficulties of applying any other legal writing.
Who wrote the passage? Choose from the following:
1. Lawrence Lessig (a broad originalist)
2. Ronald Dworkin (proponent of a moral reading of the Constitution)
3. Robert Bork (an old originalist)
4. Keith Whittington (a new originalist)
5. Jack Balkin (a living originalist)
The correct answer: (3) Robert Bork! 77 I bet that at least some readers got
the answer wrong. And I bet that some thought that the correct answer might
be any of these choices besides Bork. The passage suggests that, whether or
not Bork would admit it, he has made spectacular concessions to critics of
originalism like Dworkin. For example, notice how abstractly he conceives
original understanding (note his reference to principle or value). And notice
how open to judgment he acknowledges interpretation to be (it does not sound
like interpretation is simply a matter of discovering historical facts that are
dispositive, as opposed to elaborating abstract principles or values). Finally,
notice how slippery he is in moving from original understanding to original
76. For example, at a recent conference at Fordham University School of Law on "The New
Originalism in Constitutional Law," March 1-2, 2013, Solum suggested that, to the extent I take
fidelity to the text to operate as a constraint, I am a new originalist.
77. BORK, supra note 9, at 162-63.
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purpose (after already moving, off stage, from intention of the framers to
original understanding of the ratifiers).
The new originalism, as formulated by Solum, is more open about the
concessions it has made to critics of the old originalism like Dworkin. In
particular, Solum acknowledges that the relevant original public meaning of
certain provisions is abstract. 78 And he admits that construction, as
distinguished from interpretation, lies beyond originalism79 and may involve
choices of political theory.s0 Balkin's new originalism puts such concessions
at the heart of his abstract, living originalism, which I have interpreted to have
close affinities to Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution."
Thus, I ask, are we all moral readers now?
IV. Assumptions Undergirding the Originalist Premise
Next, I want to sketch some problematic assumptions and
misconceptions that undergird or drive the originalist premise (which in turn
underlie the view that we are all originalists now). First, I shall label these
assumptions or misconceptions through formulating them as inequations (if
that is a word). In the following formulations, I use # to mean "is not the same
as," or to mean that a commitment to the thing on the left side does not entail a
commitment to originalism. Proponents of originalism, and people who are
caught in the grip of the originalist premise, commonly make these
assumptions or hold these misconceptions. That is, they assume or assert that
a commitment to the thing on the left side does entail a commitment to
originalism.
1. Original meaning # originalism
2. Interpretation # originalism
3. Fidelity in constitutional interpretation # originalism
4. The classical, interpretive justification of judicial review #
originalism
In my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I plan to
ponder fully the reasons for the grip of the originalist premise-and these
assumptions or misconceptions-on the imaginations of constitutional
theorists and judges. Here I shall briefly explicate these assumptions or
misconceptions, illustrating them as manifested in Bork's, Scalia's, and
Whittington's work.
First, I shall argue, original meaning # originalism. Scalia says that the
originalists are the ones who care about original meaning, and all those other
78. See SOLUM, supra note 1, at 22, 24-25 (arguing that original meaning does not definitively
answer every constitutional question).
79. Id. at 26, 60.
80. See id. at 26 (describing different political theories that can underlie originalists' constitu-
tional constructions).
81. Fleming, Balkinization, supra note 62, at 675-79.
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folks-the "nonoriginalists"-are the ones who don't.8 2 But, as Dworkin ably
and tirelessly pointed out, the disagreement between Scalia and Bork and their
critics is not about whether original meaning should count-instead, it is
about what should count as original meaning.8 3 For example, should we
conceive original meaning quite narrowly and concretely (as Scalia and Bork
do) 84 -as relatively specific original meanings, as concrete expected
applications, as a deposit of concrete historical practices and detailed rules?
Or should we conceive original meaning more broadly and abstractly (as
Dworkin and Balkin do) 85-as relatively abstract commitments, as a charter of
abstract aspirational principles? Originalism reflects a particular conception
of what should count as original meaning (or a family of such conceptions),
and a highly controversial and problematic one at that. Thus, a commitment to
honoring original meaning does not necessarily entail a commitment to
originalism. In fact, I argue (with Dworkin and Balkin), the best conception of
the relevant original meaning is that of abstract aspirational principles.
Second, I shall show, fidelity in constitutional interpretation
originalism. Narrow originalists such as Bork and Scalia have asserted a
monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation, claiming that
fidelity requires following the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the
relatively specific original meaning of, the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution.8 6 Bork and Scalia say that the originalists are the ones who care
about fidelity in constitutional interpretation, and all those other folks-the
revisionists and nonoriginalists-don't. 87 The Fordham Symposium on
Fidelity in Constitutional Theory implicitly challenged the narrow
originalists' claim to a monopoly on fidelity, for it featured several competing
conceptions of fidelity: (1) Dworkin's understanding of fidelity as pursuing
integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution; 88 (2) Ackerman's
understanding of fidelity as synthesis of constitutional moments; 89
82. Scalia, supra note 21, at 852-56, 862-64.
83. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 6, at 287-305; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE 33-57 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE].
84. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 7, at 79 & n.1, 99-101 (distinguishing narrow from
broad originalism and arguing that Bork and Scalia adhere to the former view).
85. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
86. See BORK, supra note 9, at 143; Scalia, supra note 21, at 854, 862-63.
87. See BORK, supra note 9, at 187-240; SCALIA, supra note 9, at 37-47; Scalia, supra note 21, at
852-56, 862-64.
88. DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 6, at 73-76; DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra
note 66, at 125-29; Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 64, at 1253.
89. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 48, at 88, 159-62 (developing an understanding
of fidelity as questing "multigenerational synthesis" or "interpretive synthesis" across the three
constitutional regimes or moments of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal); Bruce
Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519, 1519-20 (1997) (advancing his
conception of fidelity as pursuing intergenerational synthesis).
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(3) Lessig's understanding of fidelity as translation across generations; 90
(4) Jack Rakove's understanding of fidelity as keeping faith with the founders'
vision;9 1 and (5) an early formulation of Balkin's conception that ultimately
became his method of text and principle with its argument for fidelity to
abstract original public meaning. 9 2
Most pointedly, Dworkin sought to turn the tables on the narrow
originalists like Bork and Scalia: he argued that commitment to
fidelity-understood as pursuing integrity with the moral reading of the
Constitution-entails the very approach that they are at pains to insist it
forbids and prohibits the very approach that they imperiously maintain it
mandates. 93 Ackerman, Lessig, and Balkin have taken a different tack,
attempting to beat narrow originalists at their own game: they advance fidelity
as synthesis, fidelity as translation, and the method of text and principle as
broad or abstract forms of originalism that are superior, as conceptions of
originalism, to narrow originalism. 94
And so, again, originalism reflects a particular conception of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation, and a deeply problematic one at that. Thus, a
commitment to pursuing fidelity in constitutional interpretation does not
require a commitment to originalism. To the contrary, I argue that the best
conception of fidelity is that of pursuing integrity with the moral reading of the
Constitution (in Dworkin's terms) or of redeeming the promises of the
Constitution's abstract commitments (in Balkin's terms).
Third, I shall argue, interpretation ' originalism. Originalists sometimes
claim or assume that interpretation necessarily entails originalism, ranging
from naive or crude versions of this claim (e.g., Bork and Scalia) 95 to
sophisticated versions of it (e.g., Whittington). I shall develop a critique of
90. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367-68, 1371-76 (1997)
(arguing for an understanding of fidelity as "grounded in a practice of translation"); see also Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, supra note 48, at 1263-64 (arguing for a conception of fidelity as translation).
91. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1605-09
(1997) (discussing "fidelity to history" and its superiority to originalism, which is a kind of"fidelity
through history"); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-22 (1996) (discussing the "perils" of conventional originalism).
92. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects ofOur Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1703, 1708-09 (1997) (distinguishing between fidelity to the "true Constitution or the best
interpretation of the Constitution [and] its various historical interpretations and manifestations").
Balkin subsequently reworked and incorporated this piece in JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 103-38 (2011), the companion book to
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 3-5 (arguing for fidelity to abstract text and
principle).
93. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 6, at 73-76; DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra
note 66, at 125-29; Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 64, at 1253.
94. See supra notes 89-90, 92.
95. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 9, at 251-59 ("All theories of constitutional law not based on the
original understanding contain inherent and fatal flaws."); Scalia, supra note 21, at 854 ("The
principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism . . . is its incompatibility with the very principle that
legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.").
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Whittington with respect to this assumption.96 This claim is most famously
illustrated in the old, discredited dichotomy of "interpretivism" versus
"noninterpretivism." 97 People who now call themselves originalists used this
dichotomy to load the dice in favor of interpretivism, saying that they were the
ones who believed in "interpreting" the Constitution, while the others
advocated "noninterpreting" it (or remaking or changing it).
Whittington's project in his book, Constitutional Interpretation, is to
reconstruct originalism to attempt to rescue it from criticisms of the old
originalism. 98 His general tack is to appear to concede points to critics of
originalism. For example, he more forthrightly grapples with arguments
Dworkin made about interpretation than practically any other originalist. 99
Unlike Bork and Scalia, he doesn't simply hurl insults about Dworkin being a
"noninterpretivist" or, worse yet, a heretic or expatriate who would subvert the
Constitution.0oo For example, Whittington appears to concede that Dworkin
(and Thomas Grey) were right in saying that "[w]e are all interpretivists" and
that the real question was not whether we should interpret or not, but rather,
What the Constitution is and how we should interpret it?10' Thus, Whittington
appears to concede that Dworkin advanced a conception of interpretation that
is an alternative to originalism.
What is more, Whittington's project in his companion book,
Constitutional Construction, is to broaden constitutional discourse to include
two types of elaboration of constitutional meaning: not only interpretation by
courts (the characteristic preoccupation of the old originalists) but also
96. For a fuller version of this critique, see BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 7, at 94-97.
97. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1
(1980) (distinguishing "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism"); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703-07 (1975) (distinguishing the "pure interpretive
model" from the "noninterpretive" model).
98. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 15, at xi-xii.
99. See id. at 182-87 (analyzing Dworkin's normative approach to "understanding the level of
generality in the founders' intentions"). See generally Whittington, Dworkin 's "Originalism, " supra
note 63 (writing an entire article analyzing Dworkin's constitutional theory as an abstract
originalism).
100. See BORK, supra note 9, at 136 ("subversion"); id. at 213-14 (alleging revisionism); id. at
352 ("heresies"); Scalia, supra note 21, at 854 (referring to Dworkin, an American citizen, as an
"Oxford Professor (and expatriate American)").
101. Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 12, at 606-07 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing Thomas Grey's and Dworkin's analyses of interpretation and originalism); see
also WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 15, at 164-65 ("[A]s Dworkin
himself has done, we must ask after both the nature of the Constitution and the nature of interpretation
in order to discover the best interpretive method for this text."); Whittington, Dworkin 's
"Originalisin, " supra note 63, at 197-99 ("1 do not wish to resurrect the old
interpretive/noninterpretive distinction.... I contend that Dworkin's discussion of constitutional
intentions has not rendered traditional originalism incoherent ... and that there remain substantial
differences in what different constitutional theorists are seeking to interpret.").
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construction outside the courts by legislatures and executives. 10 2 He explains
his distinction between interpretation and construction as follows:
Unlike jurisprudential interpretation, construction provides for an
element of creativity in construing constitutional meaning.
Constructions do not pursue a preexisting if deeply hidden meaning
in the founding document; rather, they elucidate the text in the
interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning, where the text is
so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but
exhaustive reduction to legal rules.10 3
But then, just when it begins to look like Whittington is developing a
constitutional theory-of interpretation and construction-that might be safe
for people who are not originalists, he makes two key moves.
The first move is to say that what people like Dworkin (and me) call
interpretation is really construction, and therefore is appropriate for
legislatures but not for courts. 104 That is, he tries to deflect the force of
Dworkin's criticisms of originalism by saying that Dworkin's conception of
interpretation more properly should be understood as a theory of construction,
which would be appropriate for legislatures, not courts. This is Whittington's
more sophisticated version of Bork's and Scalia's polemical assertions that
Dworkin is advocating judicial legislation-judges making law, not
interpreting it.
Whittington's second move is to say that a commitment to interpretation
necessarily entails a commitment to originalism. Indeed, he practically
revives a version of the discredited distinction between interpretivism and
noninterpretivism. He writes that his "account of originalism largely assumes
a prior commitment on the part of constitutional theorists, judges, and the
nation to constitutional interpretation." 105  He continues: "If we are to
interpret, then I believe we must be originalists."l 0 6 That is, interpretation
entails originalism. Whittington adds: "But we may not want to interpret....
We may want to engage in a 'text-based social practice,' but that is not the
same thing as being committed to interpretive fidelity."' 0 7 In other words, the
people who want to do that are not interpreting. Here he echoes the discredited
old charge that anyone who is not committed to an originalist conception of
interpretive fidelity is a "noninterpretivist" whose real interest is not
interpreting the Constitution but changing it.
102. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CON-
STITUTIONAL MEANING 1-2 (1999) [hereinafter WHITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION].
103. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
104. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 15, at 54, 58, 206-12;
Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 12, at 611-13.
105. Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 12, at 612.
106. Id.
107. Id at 612-13.
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I want to step back for a moment and offer a hypothesis about what
Whittington is doing. My hypothesis is that, in responding to criticisms of the
old originalism, Whittington tries to expand the realm of constitutional
discourse to include constitutional construction outside the courts; but he does
so in order to justify narrowing constitutional interpretation inside the courts
to originalism. All of this is a rhetorically effective way of seeming to agree
with arguments that no originalist could answer, while deflecting those
arguments and reinstating positions that no originalist can defend.
Whittington sketches a notion of constitutional construction by legislatures
and executives and gives historical examples of it, such as the impeachment of
Justice Samuel Chase in 1804-1805, which helped establish subsequent
understandings of the purpose and limits of federal impeachment power, and
the nullification crisis of 1832-1833, which promoted more decentralizing
conceptions of federalism. 08 Yet he does not articulate criteria for distin-
guishing kinds of decisions that are appropriately made by courts through
"interpretation" and kinds of decisions that should be left to legislatures and
executives through "construction." Nor does he answer the question of why
courts should limit themselves to what he calls interpretation as distinguished
from what he calls construction. As stated above, he throws out the old
originalist arguments for originalism based on "judicial restraint" and
"democratic majoritarianism." 109 All that is left is his assumption that
interpretation necessarily entails originalism.
Whittington forthrightly criticizes the old originalism for being circular,
question begging, and axiomatic." 0 Yet his originalism is vulnerable for the
same reasons and, more generally, it does not overcome the flaws of the old
originalism. In any case, his work embodies a sophisticated version of the
assumption that a commitment to interpretation necessarily-by definition,
axiomatically-entails a commitment to originalism. But, contrary to this
common originalist assumption, "[t]here is nothing that interpretation just is,"
as Sunstein has aptly put it.' Indeed, I argue, the best conception of
interpretation is that of law as integrity, not any variety of originalism.
Fourth, I shall argue, the classical, interpretive justification ofjudicial
review f originalism. Originalist scholars and jurists sometimes claim or
assume that the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, put
forward in The Federalist No. 781 12 and Marbury v. Madison,' 3 necessarily
108. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 102, at 17, 20.
109. Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 12, at 609.
110. See wHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 15, at 46 (describing
old originalists as having "begged the question" and having left certain points as "purely axiomatic").
111. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT
DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 19-32 (2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order
Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2867, 2870-74 (2007) (arguing that no approach to
interpretation follows from the idea of interpretation itself).
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
113. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
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entails originalism. Scalia makes this assumption in his piece, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 114 and in his partial dissent in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey." 1 In analyzing this assumption, we
should distinguish between the following two fundamental interrogatives of
constitutional interpretation: What is the Constitution? and Who may
authoritatively interpret it?ll 6 To elaborate the distinction: The answer to the
question, What does the Constitution include?-for example, text expressing
specific rules only or text embodying abstract moral principles-does not
determine the answer to the question, Who, as between legislatures and courts,
may authoritatively interpret and enforce the Constitution?, whatever it
includes.
The classical, interpretive justification for judicial review, put forward in
The Federalist No. 78 and Marbury v. Madison, is a famous answer to the Who
question: Courts are obligated to interpret the higher law of the Constitution
and to preserve and enforce it against encroachments by the ordinary law of
legislation." 7 This justification is agnostic as between the following two
competing answers to the What question. The first is a legal positivist
conception advanced by Bork and Scalia. On this view, the Constitution is
basically a code of detailed historical rules. It excludes abstract moral
principles."' 8 The second answer is Dworkin's idea of a moral reading of the
Constitution, and Barber's and my philosophic approach to constitutional
interpretation. These theorists believe the Constitution embodies a scheme of
abstract moral principles."'9 Thus, the important question becomes, What is
the Constitution? That is, What is the character of our commitments and What
does the Constitution include? In particular, which of the two foregoing
general answers is superior?
Narrow originalists like Bork and Scalia have asserted a monopoly on the
classical, interpretive justification of judicial review and on concern for
fidelity in constitutional interpretation (recall the two corresponding
inequations I formulated above). Again, they offer the foregoing legal
114. See Scalia, supra note 21, at 854 (asserting that only originalism is compatible with Chief
Justice Marshall's justification for judicial review in Marbury).
115. 505 U.S. 833, 984, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (invoking The Federalist No. 78 as if it supported his originalist view as opposed to the joint
opinion's conception of the Constitution as a scheme of abstract aspirational principles whose
interpretation requires "reasoned judgment").
116. For a work that conceives the enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of these
two fundamental interrogatives-along with a third, How ought we interpret the Constitution?-see
WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SoTIRIos A. BARBER & STEPHEN MACEDO, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 16-20 (4th ed. 2008).
117. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 112, at 467-69.
118. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 9, at 134-37 (arguing that the Constitution "abound[s] in
concrete and specific dispositions" and does not embody abstract aspirational provisions and
principles).




positivist answer to the question What does the Constitution include. The
Constitution consists of the text only, which should be understood as a code of
detailed historical rules, and it excludes any conception of a scheme of abstract
moral principles. 120 For them, the classical, interpretive justification of
judicial review requires judges to interpret and enforce the Constitution so
understood. And for them, fidelity to the Constitution so understood forbids
judicial interpretation and enforcement of abstract moral principles.12 1
Dworkin, Barber, and I have challenged the narrow originalists'
pretensions to a monopoly on the classical, interpretive justification ofjudicial
review and their understanding of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. We
have sought to reclaim and reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification
with our own conceptions of both constitutional meaning and constitutional
fidelity.12 2 The Constitution includes the text, but words like "liberty," "due
process," and "equal protection" refer to abstract moral principles. And so, for
us, the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review requires judges to
interpret and enforce the Constitution so understood. And fidelity to the
Constitution as written requires judicial interpretation and enforcement of
abstract moral principles including "liberty."
To return to my main point, the classical, interpretive justification of
judicial review does not necessarily entail a commitment to originalism.
Formally, it is agnostic as among competing conceptions of what the
Constitution is. That is, this justification simply entails that we should
interpret the fundamental law of the Constitution-whatever it is, code of
concrete rules or charter of abstract principles-and enforce it against
encroachment by the ordinary law of legislation. I argue that the better
conception of the Constitution is as a charter of abstract principles.
In this Part, I have been examining assumptions undergirding the
originalist premise, the assumption that originalism is the best or only
conception of constitutional interpretation. I grant that some
originalists-especially the new originalists like Solum-do make normative
arguments for originalism rather than simply taking it as axiomatically given.
For example, Solum makes rule of law/determinacy arguments, popular
sovereignty/democratic legitimacy arguments, and fidelity argumentsl23 for
originalism (the first two of which are the arguments Whittington evidently
120. See supra note 118.
121. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 9, at 210-14, 351-55.
122. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER 202-36 (1993)
(defending the "classical theory" but on a "moral realis[t]" reading rather than an originalist
understanding); DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 6, at 72-83 (arguing that originalists are not
faithful to the "natural reading" of the Bill of Rights as a scheme of abstract principles but instead are
"revisionists").
123. SOLUM, supra note 1, at 36-44.
1804 [Vol. 91:1785
Are We All Originalists Now?
disavowed). 124 But I argue elsewhere that the inclusiveness of the new
originalism undercuts these normative justifications.12 5
V. Why Do I Hope That We Are Not All Originalists Now?
Richard Posner confessed to a "visceral dislike . . . of academic
moralism," a body of literature bringing normative moral and political theory
to bear on legal analysis: "A lot of it strikes me as prissy, hermetic, censorious,
naive, sanctimonious, self-congratulatory, [and] insipid."l 26  I won't say
anything of this sort about originalism! I have more substantive, and less
visceral, reasons for hoping that we are not all originalists now.127
First, originalism, old and new, is at bottom authoritarian, an insult to the
founders for their arrogance, and an insult to us for our subservience.128 A
regime of purportedly dispositive original meanings is, at best, beside the point
in constitutional interpretation and, at worst, an authoritarian regime that is
unfit to rule a free and equal people. To add further insult, its proponents (at
least those besides Whittington) 129 serve it up to us in the name of
democracy! 13 0
Second, originalism, old and new, makes a virtue of claiming to exile
moral and political theory from the province of constitutional interpretation.131
That is neither possible nor desirable, nor is it appropriate in interpreting our
Constitution, which establishes a scheme of abstract aspirational principles
and ends, not a code of detailed rules. Interpreting our Constitution with
fidelity requires judgments of moral and political theory about how those
principles are best understood.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
125. James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. (forth-
coming 2013).
126. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics ofMoral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637,
1640 (1998).
127. I have made similar arguments in BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 7, at 97-98.
128. Justice Brennan famously stated that originalism is "arrogance cloaked as humility." Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution ofthe United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L.
REv. 433, 435 (1986). Brennan is clearly referring to the arrogance of originalists in claiming to be
able to determine dispositive original meaning or original intention. We might also interpret the line
as attributing arrogance to the founders for presuming in authoritarian fashion to decide our questions
for us in the manner that originalists claim they did.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42 (discussing Whittington's disavowal of the
democratic justification for originalism).
130. See, e.g., SOLUM, supra note 1, at 43 ("The connection between democratic legitimacy and
original public meaning is so close and the argument for that connection so obvious that very little
needs to be said about it.").
131. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 9, at 210-14, 351-55 (arguing against recourse to "abstract
moral philosophy" in constitutional interpretation); WHITTINGTON, supra note 15, at 182-87
(criticizing Dworkin's argument that the constitutional text embodies abstract concepts and that




Third, originalism, old and new, misconceives fidelity in constitutional
interpretation. Under the best conception of fidelity-fidelity as integrity with
the moral reading of the Constitution-we conceive fidelity as honoring our
aspirational principles-the principles to which we as a people aspire and the
principles for which we as a people stand-rather than as following our
historical practices and concrete original meanings, which surely have failed
to realize our aspirations. Ironically, in the name of interpretive fidelity,
originalists would enshrine an imperfect constitution that does not deserve our
fidelity. The moral reading, because it understands that the quest for fidelity in
interpreting our imperfect Constitution exhorts us to interpret it so as to make
it the best it can be, offers hope that the Constitution may deserve our fidelity,
or at least may be able to earn it.13
If I hope we are not all originalists now, what do I hope we (at least some
of us) are? Much of the best work in constitutional theory today is not
originalist in either an old or a new sense; rather, it is what I have called
"constructivist." (Note that I did not say "nonoriginalist." I'm not going to
fall into that rhetorical trap set by Scalia and Bork.) 133 This work
acknowledges the place of history in constitutional interpretation: it
recognizes the limitations of history but also appreciates the uses of history
(which are different from conventional originalist uses of history). In prior
work, I have developed a constitutional constructivism by analogy to John
Rawls's political constructivism, a theory he developed in Political
Liberalism. 13 4 Constitutional constructivism conceives constitutional inter-
pretation as a quest, not for the relatively specific original meaning of the
constitutional text, but for the best interpretation of our constitutional text,
history, and structure, together with our constitutional practice, tradition, and
culture. As just sketched, it conceives our Constitution as a scheme of abstract
aspirational principles and ends, not a code of detailed rules. And it entails
that interpreting our Constitution with fidelity requires judgments of moral
and political theory about how those principles and ends are best understood.
Constitutional constructivism enables us to see that history helps illuminate
the best understanding of our commitments, but it does not make our decisions
for us.
132. I must acknowledge that one avowed originalist, Jack Balkin, is not vulnerable to this
criticism. But he is not because his abstract, living originalism is a moral reading of the Constitution.
See Fleming, Balkinization, supra note 62, at 675-79.
133. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
134. FLEMING, supra note 8, at 4, 6, 61--64, 92-94 (building upon JOHN RAWLS, POLICAL
LIBERALISM 89-129 (expanded ed. 2005)).
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A. The Limitations ofHistory in Constitutional Interpretation
What would the use of history look like in a constructivist world? In this
subpart, I will speak to the limitations of history'3 5 and, in the next, to the uses
of it. In a constructivist world, we would give due regard to original meaning
and history in constitutional interpretation without being originalist. We
would embrace Dworkin's idea that there are two dimensions of best
interpretation-fit and justification. 36 Fidelity in constitutional interpretation
is not purely a matter of fit with historical materials, but also a matter of
justification in political theory. Fit and history do have a role to play in the
quest for fidelity to the Constitution, but a limited one. We should
acknowledge the place of history in constitutional interpretation-as a
resource or factor that comes into play in the dimension of fit-but should
keep it in its place. Originalists-narrow and broad, old and new-exaggerate
the place of history and give it a greater role than it deserves and than it is
capable of playing.
History is, can only be, and should only be a starting point in
constitutional interpretation. It has a threshold role, which is often not
dispositive. Contrary to originalists like Michael McConnell, fit is not
everything.137 In the dimension of fit, history helps (or should help) screen out
"off-the-wall" interpretations or purely utopian interpretations, but often does
not lead conclusively to any interpretation, let alone the best interpretation.
History usually provides a foothold for competing interpretations or
competing theories. It alone cannot resolve the clash among them. Deciding
which theory provides the best interpretation is not a historical matter of
reading more cases, tracts, or speeches or more scrupulously doing good
professional history.
To resolve the clash among competing interpretations or competing
theories, we must move beyond the threshold dimension of fit to the
dimension of justification. History rarely has anything useful, much less
dispositive, to say at that point. Indeed, the best professional historians
understand this and know better than to be originalists; unfortunately, some
constitutional lawyers and scholars do not. In deciding which interpretation
among competing acceptably fitting interpretations is most faithful to the
Constitution, we must ask further questions: which interpretation provides the
best justification, which makes our constitutional scheme the best it can be,
which does it more credit, or which answers better to our best aspirations as a
people? These questions are required by the quest for fidelity in the sense of
135. I develop the arguments of this subpart more fully in Fleming, Fidelity, supra note 54, at
1348-51.
136. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 83, at 143-45; DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE,
supra note 56, at 239.
137. See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance ofHumility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1273 (1997).
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honoring our aspirational principles, not merely following our historical
practices or the original meaning of the text.
B. The Misconceived Quest for the Original Public Meaning
Some new originalists seem to think that they can overcome the
limitations of the old originalism, and of the use of history in constitutional
interpretation, by reconceiving their quest: from intention of the Framers or
original expected applications to original public meaning. 138 The new
originalists may have reconceived the quest of the old originalists, but their
new quest for the original public meaning is likewise misconceived. The
inspiration for the title of this section is, of course, Paul Brest's classic article,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding.13 9
The quest for the original public meaning is misconceived because on
most important provisions there will not be a definitive original public
meaning that will be useful in resolving our disagreements, much less in
resolving hard cases. Let me give a hypothetical example of constitutional
amendment and interpretation. Let's imagine that, in the near future, the
Supreme Court overturns Lawrence v. Texasl40-which had recognized a right
of gays and lesbians to privacy or autonomyl 41-- even as our constitutional
culture has accepted it and has come not merely to tolerate but indeed to
respect gays and lesbians as equal citizens. Let's imagine that We the People
then amend the Constitution by adopting the following Twenty-Eighth
Amendment: "Well-ordered liberty being necessary to the happiness of a free
state, the right to autonomy shall not be infringed."
How would debates about the original public meaning of the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment likely proceed? Let's distinguish two quite
different understandings, which parallel recognizable disagreements between
originalists and moral readers of the Constitution. On the one hand,
originalists like Scalia, who want to construe constitutional language
specifically, might say that the original public meaning was simply,
specifically, and exclusively to reinstate the narrow holding in Lawrence.
Such originalists might say that the Twenty-Eighth Amendment protects only
the right of gays and lesbians to engage in "deviate sexual intercourse," as the
Texas statute invalidated in Lawrence had put it.14 2 Or, the right of gays and
lesbians to engage in "homosexual sodomy," as Justice White had put it in
Bowers v. Hardwick,14 3 which was overruled in Lawrence.'" On their view,
138. 1 develop a fuller version of the arguments of this section in Fleming, supra note 1, at
551-56.
139. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204
(1980).
140. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
141. Id. at 574.
142. Id at 563.
143. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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the Twenty-Eighth Amendment would be no more abstract a commitment to a
right to autonomy than that. They would hold this view, not because they
made an objective historical inquiry into original public meaning, but because
of prior jurisprudential assumptions and commitments about what an original
public meaning must be-and about the character of the Constitution,
constitutional interpretation, and constitutional amendment. On their view,
that evidently abstract language in the Twenty-Eighth Amendment simply has
to embody specific meanings.
On the other hand, moral readers, who conceive of the Constitution as a
charter of abstract commitments, would likely say that the original public
meaning was nothing less than to ratify the right to autonomy that the Supreme
Court had developed through the line of cases from Meyer 45 and Pierce46 on
through Griswold, 147 Roe, 148 Casey,149 and Lawrence. 150 Moreover, they
would claim that the original public meaning was to authorize the Supreme
Court to go on as it had before in these cases elaborating our basic
commitment to a right to autonomy. Indeed, they might go further and claim
that the Constitution, properly interpreted, should protect whatever rights of
autonomy we and the Supreme Court decide over time are essential to the
concept of well-ordered liberty and autonomy. They, too, would take this
view, not because they made an objective historical inquiry into original
public meaning, but because of prior jurisprudential assumptions and
commitments about the character of the Constitution, constitutional
interpretation, and constitutional amendment. On their view, that evidently
abstract language in the Twenty-Eighth Amendment simply has to embody
abstract commitments.
Let's observe that there would be no independent original public
meaning-as a matter of history-that either side could resort to in order
definitively to resolve their disagreements. Proponents of both understandings
of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment would claim that their understandings were
more faithful to the original public meaning. There would not be some
definitive original public meaning of the words "right to autonomy" out there
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
145. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (recognizing parents' right to control the
upbringing and education of their children).
146. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right of parents and
guardians "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
147. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a right to marital
privacy).
148. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (recognizing the right of a woman to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy under certain circumstances).
149. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (reaffirming the central
holding in Roe that the Constitution protects the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy).
150. See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILI-




in our constitutional culture that would resolve our disputes-any more than
there is a core public meaning of a right to autonomy out there in our
constitutional culture right now. Furthermore, there is no lawyerly term of art,
"right to autonomy," to which we could resort to resolve disagreement over the
meaning of the right to autonomy. Those who are learned in the law
vehemently disagree among themselves about it-along the lines sketched
above-just as citizens generally do. So likewise it is with the Equal
Protection Clause' 5 ' and the Due Process Clause. 152 The same goes for the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.153 Ditto the First Amendment's protections
of freedom of speech,154 freedom of the press,155 and freedom of religion. 56
So it is and ever shall be with significant constitutional provisions.
The debate, under the guise of arguments about original public meaning,
is a debate among competing moral readings of the Constitution. Any quest
for original public meaning that seeks to deny or avoid the moral reading of the
Constitution or a philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation is
misconceived. It cannot overcome the limitations of history in constitutional
interpretation and the need for a moral reading or philosophic approach.
C. The Uses offHistory in Constitutional Interpretation
So much for the limitations of history, or what history cannot do. Now,
what can history do in a constructivist world? What are the uses of history in
constitutional interpretation? Here I'll mention a few ideas illustrating what I
am calling constructivist uses of history (which differ significantly from
conventional originalist uses).
Michael Dorf has provided a rich descriptive account of argument about
original meaning as it actually functions in Supreme Court decisions.'5 7 He
shows that such argument generally is not conventionally originalist.'58 His
descriptive account richly elaborates certain ways of using history to do fit
work-to show that an interpretation under consideration has a footing in our
constitutional text, history, or structure' 59 -and it nicely accords with the type
of fit work called for by normative accounts such as Dworkin's and my own.
He develops categories of "ancestral originalism" and "heroic originalism,"
which are species of an aspirational and hortatory constitutionalism rather than
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
155. Id
156. Id
157. See generally, Dorf, supra note 48. I have praised Dorfs account in James E. Fleming,
Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1997).
158. See Dorf, supra note 48, at 1811-16 (discussing cases where original meaning, under-
standing, and history do not necessarily entail originalism).
159. See id. at 1796-800, 1805 (describing the textual, historical, and structural considerations in
constitutional interpretation).
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of originalism as conventionally understood. 160 "Ancestral originalism"
underscores the notion that an interpretation should fit our practice, tradition,
and culture. 16 1 "Heroic originalism" shows that an interpretation should be in
accord with our deepest aspirations and the best in us as a people. 16 2 These
types of argument about original meaning, and uses of history, give due regard
to original meaning without being originalist.
Likewise, Christopher Eisgruber has argued that history should
"contribute to constitutional jurisprudence as servant, not rival, to justice." 6 3
Eisgruber argues that "history matters specially to constitutional adjudication
not because (as originalists want us to believe) judges have an obligation to
preserve the past, but because historical argument can sometimes help them to
represent the people's convictions about justice." 64 For example, in making
judgments about justice in interpreting abstract constitutional provisions like
the Equal Protection Clause or the Executive Power Clause,165 judges "cannot
simply act on the basis of their own best judgment about justice." 66 Instead,
judges should draw upon history to "show that those judgments are plausibly
attributable to the American people as a whole."' 67 Thus, on his conception of
constitutional self-government, judges resort to history, not to obey the "dead
hand of the past," but to enable them to discharge their responsibilities as a
representative institution speaking on behalf of the people about questions of
moral and political principle.16 8
Reva Siegel's work illustrates that history matters, not as it binds our
choices-as it were, through "the law of the father"-but as it informs our
choices, decisions for which we as a people are responsible.169 Similarly,
Martin Flaherty has suggested that in a "post-originalist" world, we would
take an "experiential" rather than an authoritarian approach to the use of
history in constitutional interpretation. 17 0 For example, we would look to
"past experience to assess how given constitutional doctrines or mechanisms
have succeeded or failed.""'7  He shows that such use of history held a central
place in the early republic.' 72
160. See id. at 1800-16.
161. Id at 1802-03.
162. See id. at 1803-04.
163. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 127 (2001).
164. Id. at 110.
165. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
166. EISGRUBER, supra note 163, at 126.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 11, 64.
169. E.g., Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 343 (2001).
170. Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1107-11 (2001).
171. Id. at 1092.
172. See id. at 1107 ("Call this post-originalist approach to constitutional history 'experiential.'
Hamilton much earlier extolled the method, urging, 'Let experience, the least fallible guide of human
opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these [constitutional] questions."').
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Finally, Balkin's work, although he characterizes it as a "living
originalism," shows how history figures in a moral reading of the Constitu-
tion. History-whether evidence of original public meaning or
precedent-functions as a resource for making arguments about the best
understandings of our constitutional commitments, not as a constraint that
makes our decisions for us.' 73 Abner Greene's work, although it is avowedly
anti-originalist, is similar to Balkin's in showing how history-or fit with
original public meaning or precedent-serves as a factor in making arguments
about the best understanding of the Constitution as a matter of justice. 174
These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive of what I call
constructivist uses of history as distinguished from conventional originalist
uses.
VI. Conclusion: Toward a Philosophic Approach to Fidelity in Constitutional
Interpretation
In sum, a constructivist world would look somewhat like the
pre-originalist world (that is, the pre-Borkian world), although it would be far
more sophisticated theoretically than that world was. It would treat original
meaning as one source of constitutional meaning among several, not the
exclusive source, let alone the exclusive legitimate theory. It would use
history for what it teaches rather than for what it purportedly decides for us. In
a constructivist world, we would understand that history is a jumble of open
possibilities, not authoritative, determinate answers. We would understand
that we-self-styled originalists no less than the rest of us-always read the
past selectively, from the standpoint of the present, in anticipation of the
future. We look to the past, not for authoritative answers, but for illumination
about our experience and our commitments.
Finally, we would understand that it dishonors the past to pretend-in the
name of originalism-that it authoritatively decides questions for us, and to
pretend that it avoids the burden of making normative arguments about the
meaning of our commitments to abstract moral principles and ends. Fidelity in
interpreting the Constitution as written requires a philosophic approach to
constitutional interpretation. No approach-including no version of
originalism-can responsibly avoid philosophic reflection and choice in
interpreting the Constitution.
173. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 258-59.
174. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN
A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 192, 197, 201-06 (2012) (arguing that there is "room for fit" with history as
a "factor" in arguments about the best understanding of the Constitution, but that "reasoning about
political justice" or "justification" should have "primacy" over fit). I have analyzed Greene's account
of "room for fit" and the "primacy of justification" in James E. Fleming, Fit, Justification, and
Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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In my book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, I gave three reasons for
embracing a philosophic approach or moral reading over and against any
version of originalism. I shall close this Article by repeating them.
The first reason is hortatory: [The moral reading] exhorts judges,
elected officials, and citizens to reflect on and deliberate about our
deepest principles and highest aspirations as a people. It does not
conceive the commitment of fidelity to the Constitution as commanding
us to follow the authority of the past. [In a word, it rejects the
authoritarianism of originalism as inappropriate and unjustifiable in a
constitutional democracy.]
The second, related reason is critical: [The moral reading]
encourages, indeed requires, a reflective, critical attitude toward our
history and practices rather than enshrining them. It recognizes that our
principles may fit and justify most of our practices or precedents but
that they will criticize some of them for failing to live up to our
constitutional commitments to principles such as liberty and equality.
Put another way, [the moral reading] does not confuse or conflate our
principles and traditions with our history, or our aspirational principles
with our historical practices. Again, it recognizes that fidelity to the
Constitution requires honoring our aspirational principles, not
following our historical practices and concrete original understanding.
That is, fidelity to the Constitution requires that we disregard or
criticize certain aspects of our history and practices in order to be
faithful to the principles embodied in the Constitution.
The final reason is justificatory: [The moral reading], because it
understands that the quest for fidelity in interpreting our imperfect
Constitution exhorts us to interpret it so as to make it the best it can be,
gives us hope of interpreting our imperfect Constitution in a manner
that may deserve our fidelity, or at least may be able to eam it.'7 5
Unlike originalism, it does not enshrine an imperfect constitution that does not
deserve our fidelity.
That, in short, is why I hope we are not all originalists now.
175. FLEMING, supra note 8, at 226-27.
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